"Good" has a whole range of interpretations, many of them implicit. Socrates would probably be more likely to use a term like "virtuous" or "right," to avoid the connotation of personal benefit or gain. Crito thinks largely of what would be "good" for him when he seeks to free Socrates largely for the sake of his reputation--Socrates thinks of what is virtuous or right when he uses reason to arrive at a particular conclusion.
In a purely ethical sense, it would seem that the action itself matters more than the intent. For one thing, it might be impossible to escape any kind of ego-mongering in our virtuous actions--we are, after all, possessed of an ego and are hard-pressed to step outside it. If I save another's life and think mostly of my social standing, Socrates might call me out as not being a totally virtuous person--but I've still performed the same action as a virtuous person.
Loose lips sink ships! That was a good catch, and I agree that virtuous would have been a better choice of words.
I agree, but I think there is a difference within ourselves and how we feel after the action. Any action that produces a virtuous reaction would be right, but any virtuous action done for wrong reasons would not feel right. So a person that donates his time to a worthy charity for the attention it brings him would not have the same satisfaction as someone else who did it because they believe in the cause. It might not have an immediate effect, but in the end I believe our life will be measured out in intent, not impact.
Suppose I do something we agree is good -- like rebuild the nation's infrastructure -- but I do it for corporatist rather than public-spirited motives, and for that reason I do it in the wrong way (say, with putative public-private partnerships that enable my oligarch buddies to enrich themselves bigly at public expense). In the end I will certainly have accomplished something important (if at excessive cost), so it is to that consequentialist extent good. But at the same time you would owe me no real moral praise, for both my motives and my means are severely compromised. So it is far from virtuous, and very far from unqualifiedly good.
If an act has a desirable, arguably good consequence, the act that caused it can still be considered immoral, or not good, because of the intent behind it. Consequences are separate from the events that cause them, and be should be judged separately.
"Good" has a whole range of interpretations, many of them implicit. Socrates would probably be more likely to use a term like "virtuous" or "right," to avoid the connotation of personal benefit or gain. Crito thinks largely of what would be "good" for him when he seeks to free Socrates largely for the sake of his reputation--Socrates thinks of what is virtuous or right when he uses reason to arrive at a particular conclusion.
ReplyDeleteIn a purely ethical sense, it would seem that the action itself matters more than the intent. For one thing, it might be impossible to escape any kind of ego-mongering in our virtuous actions--we are, after all, possessed of an ego and are hard-pressed to step outside it. If I save another's life and think mostly of my social standing, Socrates might call me out as not being a totally virtuous person--but I've still performed the same action as a virtuous person.
Loose lips sink ships! That was a good catch, and I agree that virtuous would have been a better choice of words.
DeleteI agree, but I think there is a difference within ourselves and how we feel after the action. Any action that produces a virtuous reaction would be right, but any virtuous action done for wrong reasons would not feel right. So a person that donates his time to a worthy charity for the attention it brings him would not have the same satisfaction as someone else who did it because they believe in the cause. It might not have an immediate effect, but in the end I believe our life will be measured out in intent, not impact.
Suppose I do something we agree is good -- like rebuild the nation's infrastructure -- but I do it for corporatist rather than public-spirited motives, and for that reason I do it in the wrong way (say, with putative public-private partnerships that enable my oligarch buddies to enrich themselves bigly at public expense). In the end I will certainly have accomplished something important (if at excessive cost), so it is to that consequentialist extent good. But at the same time you would owe me no real moral praise, for both my motives and my means are severely compromised. So it is far from virtuous, and very far from unqualifiedly good.
ReplyDeleteIf an act has a desirable, arguably good consequence, the act that caused it can still be considered immoral, or not good, because of the intent behind it. Consequences are separate from the events that cause them, and be should be judged separately.
ReplyDelete